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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the patterns of Venture Capital (VC) investment in dedicated 
biotech firms (DBFs) in the therapeutic and diagnostic sectors (bio-healthcare). We 
use a database of 655 UK bio-healthcare deals to map the geographical flows of VC 
investment and measure the co-location of investors and DBFs. Then, using 20 face-
to-face interviews with venture capitalists (VCs) and DBF firms in Cambridge and 
Scotland, we study the strategic motives underlying the co-location of investors and 
investee companies and reflect on the catalytic role VCs play in context of the 
Scottish and Cambridge bio-clusters. From the viewpoint of VC-related policies, we 
find that our study is more in line with arguments stressing the attractive power of 
“investor-ready” opportunities (Mason and Harrison 2003) than supply-side 
approaches that take VC presence at the core of high-tech clusters for granted. In line 
with Avnimelech et al (2008), we propose that VC policy should be consistent with 
the wider strategic objectives innovation and technology policy. 
Keywords: Intermediation; financing; venture capital; biotechnology; DBF; investor 
proximity; geography 
1. Introductory notes: “Classic” and “Merchant” VC 
VC originally recombined the role of scientists, investors, capitalists, entrepreneurs, 
and managers. In the US, the volume of VC investment accelerated in the 90’s, as 
fundraising grew thanks to increased investments by pension funds and large 
corporations (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). This growth ended with the stock market 
collapse of 2001 and the subsequent downturn had negative implications for early-
stage ventures (OECD 2003). Thus, originally emerging as a quasi public 
intermediary to invest in technology-oriented firms with high growth potential, VCs 
have become increasingly oriented towards established businesses.  
VCs oriented towards ventures at their seed, start-up and expansion stages, with 
principally knowledge-based assets, are referred to by Mason and Harrison (2002) as 
‘classic’ VC. VCs that focus on later stages, including management buy-outs or buy-
ins, are referred to as ‘merchant’ VC.  In spite of the expansion of ‘merchant VC’, 
“classic” VC continues to be a catalyst of clustering dynamics in areas such as 
California and Massachusetts (Gompers and Lerner 2001) and a key component of the 
local infrastructure of innovation (Powell 2002). As Florida and Kenney (1988) put it, 
‘classic’ VC represents a ‘third-way’ in the Schumpeterian dichotomy between 
corporate and entrepreneurial capitalism. VCs act as ‘technological gate-keepers’ 
which steer and direct companies towards those regions with the ideal mix of factors 
to promote innovation, such as Universities, R&D capabilities, and managerial skills.  
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VC investment in bio-healthcare is motivated by the promise that the industrial 
application of molecular biology will lead to the discovery of new and better solutions 
for patient healthcare and the exploitation of large unmet opportunities. In spite of 
rather disappointing performances by both financial and operational measures, the 
business of bio-healthcare has maintained attractive to investors event throughout the 
2001 downturn (Pisano 2006). Then, in the 2005/07 period R&D and financial 
performances improved both in the US and EU. In 2006, the pipelines of publicly 
traded EU DBFs grew by 30%, with around 700 new compounds in clinical trials, 
plus 27 compounds awaiting regulatory approval. Europe's privately held DBFs were 
estimated to have 800 drugs in their pipelines, and 12 compounds in registration. 
Revenues in 2006 increased by 13% to €13.3bn (compared to a 12% fall in 2003), 
market capitalisation increased by 43% to €62bn (Ernst & Young 2007).   
In 2007, companies in the Americas and EU raised more than US$29.9 billion, a 
new high excluding the outlier genomics bubble year of 2000. VC financing reached 
$7.5 billion, global revenues of public biotech companies increased by 8%  
(amounting to $80 billion) and the global industry’s net loss decreased from $7.4 
billion in 2006 to US$2.7 billion in 2007 (Ernst & Young 2008).  Even in 2008, 
biotechnology continued to represent 28% of total investments (2nd largest sector). 
However, due to the current financial crisis year 2008 was one of the most negative 
for market capitalisation and IPOs. All forms of financing plunged in comparison 
with 2007 (	

) including VC investment that 
contracted by 15% (
),  
Worldwide, some locations have become epicentres of path-breaking research 
efforts in bioscience, with the ability to attract skilled people and risk capital (Cooke 
2007). In this paper, we use both quantitative data and interview data to map the 
geographical flows of “classic” VC investment in UK bio-healthcare.  We investigate 
why distinctive patterns of investment arise and evaluate the importance of co-
location between investors and DBFs for determining the patterns observed.  In so 
doing, we explore whether UK VCs play a catalytic role (Florida and Kenney 1988; 
Avnimelech and Teubal 2006) vis-à-vis bio-cluster emergence (Powell et al 2002; 
Niosi and Banik 2005; Cooke 2007). 
2. Venture capital investment in biotechnology: Risks, opportunities and 
current trends 
For many years the drug discovery method of Pharmaceutical Corporations (PCs) 
was referred to as random screening. Under this approach, large numbers of natural 
and chemically derived compounds are randomly screened in experiments for 
potential therapeutic activities. In spite of increasing R&D budgets and a drop in 
screening costs per compound (Northrup 2005), since the mid-80s this approach has 
been characterised by lower productivity and negligible economies of scale.  Many 
practitioners now feel that an improved understanding of the biological basis of life 
allow for better and more informed choices before entering the development stage. 
New discoveries in the domain of life sciences stem to a significant extent from 
publicly funded research. Thousands of DBFs, a significant proportion of which are 
spin-offs of university labs, have embarked on translating scientific advances into 
proprietary concepts and platforms that are used by PCs to fill emptying pipelines. 
Critical I (2006) reported the existence of 3806 biotech companies at varying stage of 
development: 150 of them (83 in the US and 67 in the EU) account for 44% of total 
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employees, 35% of the research effort and 60% of the revenues. From a geographical 
point of view, DBFs tend to proliferate in proximity of bioscience intensive areas, that 
is, locations characterised by a significant concentration of public and private research 
budgets, activities and infrastructures, medical hospitals and an array of 
intermediaries that can help remedy competence gaps (Audretsch and Stephan 1996; 
Cooke 2004 and 2007; Powell et al 2002; Rosiello 2008). 
Overall, the main motivation for VCs to invest is an expectation of enormous 
returns, Northrup (2005) estimates that given opportunities to cure disease the 
pharmaceutical market is potentially worth $1.6 trillion. From an investor’s 
viewpoint, however, drug R&D is perceived as long-term, capital intensive and 
uncertain. Indeed, because of the rapid pace of innovation, the uncertainty and 
complexity of both the technological solutions and the underlying science, and the 
high costs of clinical trials, the chances of a drug candidate going through concept 
development, regulatory approval and commercialisation remain low.  
Technological uncertainty relates to fundamental questions about technical 
feasibility. The industrial application of molecular biology entails an in-depth 
understanding of the biological processes of disease. At the same time, drug 
development requires major investments throughout all stages of basic research, drug 
development, clinical trials, regulatory approval and large scale distribution of the 
product. Regulatory uncertainty is primarily caused by the low probability that a 
product receives approval from a competent body. The extreme case is that of drug 
discovery where regulatory approval includes approval of pre-clinical screens, reports 
of all clinical tests, and other aspects of preclinical process, and product development.  
The entire discovery-development process may take between 10 to 17 years. 
Another source of uncertainty is price regulation. Differences exist among 
countries. In the US, personal insurances tend to induce cost-conscious behaviour by 
prescribing doctors (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). In most European countries, 
governments exercise forms of direct and indirect control. In the UK, caps are defined 
in relation to the overall rate of return. The margin is negotiated by each firm with the 
Department of Health which receives advice by the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence that employs cost-benefit analysis to decide which treatments should be 
made available through the NHS, causing additional delays and uncertainty.  
Some legislation is aimed to reduce uncertainty, time to market and R&D costs. A 
classical example is the Orphan Drug Law ratified by the US Congress in 1983 and 
providing companies with 7 years exclusivity on new products as well as mechanisms 
for quicker approval. More recently fast track drug development programs have 
introduced to facilitate the development of life-threatening diseases, like cancer. 
3. On intermediation, risk management and added-value 
The risk profile of many DBFs is such that most financial institutions (especially in 
Europe) are not inclined to supply loans or other forms of finance. VC can be a 
solution, but various problems remain. Firstly, DBFs tend to lack tangible assets 
required as collateral to obtain finance. Secondly, investees often use the money 
raised to support transaction-specific activities, which increases the risk of non-
redeployability in the case of failure. Thirdly, business development is affected by 
high attrition rates, changing regulation, and high financial requirements. Finally, 
investors face information asymmetries, in that entrepreneurs are generally better 
informed about the prospect to achieve a successful exit than VCs. 
 4 
The economic literature has mainly portrayed VC as a financial intermediary able 
to lessen transaction costs and deal with information asymmetries (Gompers and 
Lerner 2001). This function seems important especially in the presence of complex 
processes and uncertain conditions.  For example, Gompers and Lerner (2001) 
explicitly refer to situations where the management team of a DBF either over-invests 
in basic research or raises unsustainable amounts of debt.  When the contracting 
parties are linked by bilateral dependency, as in the case of VCs and investee DBFs, 
distortion of information and non-disclosure may arise. Thus, according to Pisano 
(2006, 136), in the context of biotech, VC “needs to be understood as both a source of 
funding and as a mode of corporate governance. VCs do not just provide money; their 
investment comes with close oversight”.  
However, DBFs frequently need not only money, but also active management 
support and advice. In that respect, the “added-value” approach to VC lays emphasis 
on the provision of strategic advice and management support in terms of capabilities 
and network of contacts that contribute to business development. Depending on 
circumstances, VCs are viewed as knowledge reservoirs (Zook, 2004), coaches 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002) or certification providers (Hsu 2004).  Such functions 
seem particularly important in locations where serial entrepreneurs and experienced 
managers are in short supply, and companies are typically started-up by research 
scientists who lack business acumen. 
VCs can provide assistance to recruit senior managers and, at times, replace the 
scientific founders with experienced managing and financial directors. The VCs’ 
investment decisions are “based on opinions, projections, and conjecture, which may 
be extremely difficult to codify”, in some cases on “gut feelings about the people 
involved” (Zook 2004, 634). As a result, VCs gather information to assess the risk 
associated with specific investments via professional and personal networks. Once the 
company has been selected, VCs will be able to use the same network to support their 
investees and protect their investment. Hsu (2004) claims that investees are willing to 
offer a 10-14% discount in the share-holding agreement to high-reputation VCs.  
4. On intermediation and locational choices  
4.1. Scouting, assessing and monitoring 
Various sources, including Powell et al (2002), Porter et al (2005), Cooke (2007), 
Critical I (2006) and 
, suggest that VC investment in bio-
healthcare is concentrated (especially in the US) only in a few regions. Such 
concentration is due to the fact that research and capital intensive industries, such as 
biotechnology, shape the firm’s tendency to locate in close proximity to public 
research laboratories and universities, generating bio-clusters which exhibit a variety 
of network and knowledge externalities (Cooke 2004). From an investor viewpoint, 
being located in these areas means that selecting and screening good opportunities can 
be more easily accomplished nearby world-class bioscience (Orsenigo 2006), ‘star’ 
scientists (Audretsch and Stephen 1996) and a high number of DBFs.   
First, proximity facilitates face-to-face interaction and the transfer of vital 
information – know-what (Florida and Smith 1990). Second, most investments are 
referred deals, meaning that VCs are more likely to invest in business opportunities 
that come up from people they know and trust (Zook 2004). To sustain a steady flow 
of referred deals, VCs need to invest in social capital. Social capital tends to originate 
from the intersection of weak ties (Granovetter 1973), social and professional 
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relationships and attendance at various events. Further, reputation and trust take time 
to develop and are the normally the result of long-term working relationships. This is 
clearly the case of business angels (BAs) who tend to invest in local companies, build 
their reputation and network in the location where they operate, and use this network 
to value to co-located investees (Madill et al 2005). 
Third, proximity is important for monitoring. VCs take seats on the board of 
directors either directly or by appointing non-executive directors that they trust. Some 
advisors and non-executive directors spend a considerable amount of time in direct 
contact with companies and are habitually located nearby. If the investment is made at 
a long distance or in places where VCs lack contacts, problems may arise in finding 
non-executive directors and advisors and/or communicating with them (Zook 2004). 
4.2. Adding-value 
The added-value argument appears particularly salient in bio-healthcare, a sector that 
entails an intrinsically high technological and regulatory uncertainty in front of long 
times of realisation and high capital requirements. The transfer of added-value by 
VCs coincides with the absorption and development of capabilities and contacts that 
may not be available internally, but are vital to develop and commercialise new 
technology and products. Hence, the relationship with VCs may be essential not only 
to raise money, but also to promote inter-organisational learning and growth.  
Many new DBFs are built upon relevant scientific expertise and intellectual 
property (IP). These assets are distributed across a number of centres of excellence 
worldwide. However, only some of such centres of excellence have been able to 
exploit them commercially at a large scale (Cooke 2007). This may be due to the 
absence of the necessary infrastructure for innovation, encompassing and array of 
market and non market mechanisms for knowledge creation, transfer and exploitation.  
According to Powell et al (2002, 196), in biotechnology VCs provide “more than 
just money”. Since most founders of DBFs are scientists with little business acumen 
and managerial experience, “venture capitalists often do much more than monitor or 
advise; they may even play a hands-on role in the running of the young company”. 
VCs investing in DBFs are often endowed with plentiful contacts, idiosyncratic 
knowledge of specific sub-sectors relating to product development, 
commercialisation, negotiation, recruitment and training of managers and sales 
forces), and the capability to validate risky projects by simply investing in them. 
Thus, while bio-clusters grow by attracting R&D budgets, technical and 
managerial skills and VC, co-location facilitates the transfer of uncodified knowledge 
and know-how (Florida and Smith 1990) via “open conduits” (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2004). Such conduits consist of professional networks, face-to-face 
relationships, various types of academic collaborations, and public-private 
partnerships (Powell et al 2002; Cooke 2007; and Rosiello 2008).  
This picture, however, leaves some questions unanswered. Many authors agree that 
VC can stimulate innovation and co-location presents advantages in terms of 
interactivity and knowledge transfer. However, works such as Florida and Smith 
(1990) and Avnimelech and Teubal (2006) warn that the existence of a VC 
market/industry at the heart of a high tech cluster cannot be taken for granted. A 
similar assumption seems especially hazardous for VC policy (Avnimelech et al 
2008), as it may inspire strategies that aim at inducing demand via direct injection of 
risk capital and/or institutional change (see Gilson 2003; Da Rin et al 2006).  
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From a different angle, Florida and Smith (1990) and Mason and Harrison (2003) 
suggest that VC flows are to some extent responsive to the presence of “investor-
ready” opportunities. Thus, the challenge faced by emerging clusters is that early-
stage investors struggle to find an adequate population of companies capable of 
generating the sort of returns they seek. Notwithstanding the importance of 
institutional change, the main problem often resides on the lack of technical, 
entrepreneurial and managerial competence (Gompers et al 2006; Rosiello 2008). 
In this sense, putting events in the right perspective may require focusing on the 
co-evolution (rather than the separate evolution) of science, technology, VC, and a 
range of complementary capabilities which are crucial for cluster emergence. For 
instance, in the context of ICT Avnimelech and Teubal (2006) introduce the concept 
of an extended life cycle. Here the emphasis is on institutional change as well as the 
creation and accumulation of business development capacity, a process that represents 
a necessary pre-condition for emergence. The normative implication is that VC can 
support and accelerate emergence if only if the appropriate set of pre-conditions is 
already in place. 
Most research in this area has been conducted in the US and some of it relates to 
other industries, especially ICT. As technology, sector and context-specific factors 
can play a crucial role in shaping cluster emergence (Bresnahan and Gambardella 
2004; Cooke 2007; Avnimelech et al 2008), we investigate whether similar dynamics 
of emergence apply to the UK bio-healthcare sector. 
5. Methodology 
This work employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. Our interview-based 
study (whose goals exceeded the scope of this paper) initially aimed to find out 
whether and how VCs deal with ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetries. 
Second, it examined whether the importance of VC is not only tied to the contractual 
relationship with DBFs, but also to the provision of added-value. Finally, it looked at 
Scotland and Cambridge, considering the question whether the characteristics of the 
local clusters, including their stage of development, have any effect on the frequency 
of knowledge transfer, ways of interacting, and the extent to which VC networks are 
regionally bounded.  
Key actors in Scotland and Cambridge were interviewed, including CEOs and 
Business Development Managers of nine companies directly involved in the 
discovery and development of new solutions for patient healthcare, of which five had 
R&D facilities in Scotland and five in Cambridge. All companies were founded 
between 1994 and 2002, and had at least two rounds of VC investment and five of 
them had already products in the market or at an advanced stage in clinical trials. The 
sample also included nine actors with a direct knowledge of private equity investment 
in bio-healthcare. They all have offices in either Scotland or Cambridge. Finally, one 
interviewee worked with the East of England Development Agency, one with Scottish 
Enterprise and one with a regional bio-network in Cambridge.   
Alongside qualitative information, we created a quantitative database detailing (i) 
the VCs and DBFs’ name, address, location, age (for the DBFs), type of investors 
(while our focus remains on “classic” VC, we distinguish between “institutional” and 
“non-institutional” VCs – family-friends, BAs and public schemes) and (ii) the 
investment, round type (private equity, exit or M&A) and amount. The data set starts 
with 1996 and covers the period until September 2006; it includes 655 deals within 
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the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors.  The investment data was sourced from 
Library House in Cambridge which provided the list of firms with head offices in the 
UK that received equity financei. 
We use these data to measure the concentration of VCs’ offices and VC investment 
(number of deals and amounts invested) in the 12 UK Government Office Regions 
(GORs). Using postal codes, we classify VC investments as “local” if the VCs and the 
investee company are located within the same GOR; “adjacent” is they take place 
within a region that shares a border with the local “region”, and “non-local” in all of 
the other cases. As far as deal involving investment syndicates are concerned, we 
define them as “local” when at least one of the partners was located in the same GOR 
as the investee company and “adjacent” when in a GOR sharing borders with that of 
the investee. The quantitative sample is combined with data concerning the 
distribution of Gross Added value (GVA) among GORs to assess the distribution of 
VC weighted for GVA and with data provided by the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA, 2005) to assess the magnitude of VC investment in the UK bio-
healthcare sector compared to other EU countries.  
The majority of the investments (55% of institutional deals, rising to 65% of deals 
involving a BVCA member) are made by syndicates of investors. Thus, in order to 
reduce the margin of error, we assess the co-location of VCs and investees by 
considering VCs-DBFs dyads in which the VC’s location coincide with that of the 
first-named investor in the database (or its local office when the VC firms has got 
one). First-named investors are assumed to be the syndicate leaders and we compare 
the results of this test with those obtained without restrictions in the number of 
partners. Obtaining similar results would be interpreted as an indication that the 
leaders of the syndicate are more likely to be located in proximity to their investments 
as they are normally in change of dealing with transactional problems and/or added-
value provision.  
In order to process the information gathered during the interviews we used NVivo 
software and the grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Various coding 
techniques have been employed to (i) label conceptual categories and unveil logical 
connections; (ii) identify, categorise and describe phenomena found in the text; and 
(iii) distinguish between core and non-core categories and phenomena, which helped 
to synthesise ideas and identify possible answers to the research questions. 
6. Findings 
Within the context of the UK, Scotland and Cambridge have bio-clusters 
characterised by different profiles of emergence. Both Scotland and Cambridge are 
bioscience and biotechnology intensive areas. However, Cambridge seems already to 
have achieved a critical mass of skills, capital and industrial activities and its 
emergence appears to have been spontaneous, in that public bodies have not been in 
the driving seat (aside from investments in basic research).  
Around two hundred DBFs and three hundred and fifty providers of specialist 
services within the domain of the life sciences are situated in Cambridge. In addition, 
there are more than thirty research institutes and universities, twenty multinationals in 
pharmaceutical, agro-bio and food, and four medical hospitals involved in biotech 
research.  The University of Cambridge plays a vital role, as highlighted by the 
numerous collaborations that involve its departments and the high number of spinouts 
it generates. According to Garnsey and Heffernan (2005), twelve departments had 
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been the source of forty-two spinouts. Outside London, Cambridge has the highest 
concentration of VC-backed companies: biotechnology, med-care and 
pharmaceuticals attract the majority of this investment, accounting for 42% of all 
deals in 2004-06 (Library House 2006). 
Scotland is yet to experience full emergence and public bodies play an important 
role in driving the process forward. Following the process of political devolution in 
the late 90s, Scottish Enterprise has been invested with the challenge of designing and 
implementing a policy framework to support the development of the Scottish 
biotechnology industry, predominantly clustered around the cities of Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Dundee. Some targets were set to be met by 2003, including 100 
DBFs, 250 support and supply organisations, 24,000 jobs, and the creation of strategic 
linkages and networks within and beyond the boundaries of the local communities.  
By the end of that period, the Scottish biotechnology sector employed roughly 
26,000 people. However, the majority of Scottish DBFs were small in size and a 
significant number of those involved in drug discovery struggled in the early phases 
of discovery and pre-clinical trials (Rosiello 2007).  More recently, however, the 
scope and number of public initiatives has been expanded (Rosiello 2008), three 
DBFs with HQ in Scotland went public in London and one in New York, and Wyeth 
(a North-American PC) got directly involved in the Scottish Translational Medicine 
Research Collaboration (
	).  
To date, Cambridge remains the prominent UK bio-cluster and a magnet for public 
research funding, skills and VC (Casper and Karamanos 2003; Library House 2006). 
Being closer to the City of London where most VCs have offices facilitates 
networking and personal interaction, whereas Scottish investees tend to rely on a mix 
of local angel groups, public finance and external providers of funding.  
6.1. The concentration of VC investment in specific regions and co-location of VCs 
and investee companies 
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors constitute a significant component of 
the UK economy, employing around 73,000 people in 2005, over a third in R&D and 
22,400 in core biotechnology.  In 2005, the UK’s biotechnology sector was the 
European largest and most robust, with around 450 DBFs, generating over €5billion 
in revenues and awaiting 224 new drugs in clinical trials – around 40% of the EU 
total. In 2006, 7 out of 32 IPOs and 8 of the top 10 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
deals involved UK based DBFs (E&Y 2007). According to EVCA (2005) data, the 
UK attracts a higher proportion of VC investment than any other EU country.  
[Insert table one about here] 
Table 2 provides a summary of the investment activity in the UK for 
biopharmaceutical firms for the period 2000-Sept 2006, during this period a total of 
592 investments were made with a recorded deal value of £1,713m.  The table shows 
the investment activity broken down according to institutional investment, non-
institutional investment, and investment in the form of Government investment, grants 
and investments from research charities.  By far the most influential category is the 
institutional VC accounting for 71% of deals and 91% of the value of investment 
recorded.  Therefore, we concentrate our analysis in the remainder of this paper onto 
the activities related to institutional deals. The East of England (an area containing 
Cambridgeshire) takes the largest shares of activity across all three categories of 
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investment.  The other main investment regions of the UK are the South East of 
England (an area containing Oxfordshire), the London area and Scotland. These four 
regions are most active in terms of both deals count and total investment. 
[Insert table two about here] 
The results from Table 3 confirm that VCs’ money in the bio-healthcare sector 
tends to flow into the Eastern region, the South East and Scotland. This becomes even 
more salient when we weigh investment by regional GVA. The East of England, 
South East and Scotland have the three higher ratios of the 12 UK regions, which 
reflect the distribution of biotech-related activities across the country. 
[Insert table three about here] 
Having established that VC investment in bio-healthcare is unevenly distributed 
both across Europe and the UK; the next step is to find out whether co-location plays 
any role in shaping this distribution. The UK VC industry tends to be located in the 
City of London and around 70% of VC investments in the bio-healthcare sector are 
syndicated among a variable number of partners. Firstly we concentrate on a core 
group of UK investors who are members of the British VC Association (BVCA).  
This association represents the interests of VCs making investments in the UK and 
therefore we can expect this group to represent the core expertise in VC deal making 
in the UK.  Table 4 shows the number of deals in our dataset involving at least one 
registered BVCA member, and the location of the nearest office of the BVCA 
syndicate member in each particular deal. We also include the regional presence 
according to office locations of BVCA members active in our database. 
[Insert table four about here] 
We find that for deals made in any UK region where there is at least one BVCA 
member in the syndicate (265 deals), then it is very likely that at least one BVCA 
member will be found within the same or an adjacent region to the firm receiving 
funding.  Our analysis finds this to be the case in 90% of deals involving a BVCA 
member; in over 64% of these deals a BVCA member is locally based. When we look 
at the “first-named” investors (assuming that they are the syndicate’s leaders), we find 
that in 86% of cases when a BVCA member is the first named the investor they also 
have an office location classified as in a region either local or adjacent to the firm.  
This result strengthens our observations that investors who are located near their 
investment play an active role.  
Table 4 also shows large variation in the dyadic relationships of these deals across 
regions.  The proportion of investments involving a local BVCA member ranges from 
30% to 100%, and ranges between 55% and 100% for investors based within regions 
adjacent to the deal.   The final column shows the regional coverage of BVCA 
members in terms of office locations.  The association of VC’s with London is clearly 
shown by the 154 investors (from a total of 195 investors active in this population of 
firms) having an office presence in Greater London.  Similarly, all deals made in 
London involve a VC with a London office.    
We also find the East and South Eastern regions have a relatively low proportion 
of investors based locally, but a high level of investors from the surrounding regions.  
This is explained by the proximity of the South East and Eastern regions to London.  
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In contrast Scotland (3i have an office based in Scotland, which invests in oil, gas and 
power generation and is not included in this analysis) has the lowest proportion of 
BVCA investors with proximate office presence.  Scotland attracts little investment 
from BVCA members based in Northern regions of England, although we also find 
that a significant amount of Scottish institutional deals involve London based 
investors. Such evidence evokes Sorenson and Stuart (2001, 1582) argument that the 
co-location of at least one syndication partner allows VCs “to rely on the evaluation 
of another investor closer to the target in industrial or physical space”. However, this 
type of proximity relates to connections with VCs based in a financial centre; hence it 
is not necessarily comparable to the one seen in US technology clusters. In this 
respect, in section 6.3 we discuss the role of specialist VC. 
Overall these figures show that VC investment in UK bio-healthcare is 
concentrated in specific regions and the majority of deals involve geographical 
proximity, that is, the investment is classified as either local or adjacent to a VC’s 
office.  The ‘Golden Triangle’ corresponds to 49% of deals made and 60% of the total 
value of investments made in the UK (see Table 5).  Also, 58% of institutional deals 
in this area involve at least one local VC investor, and virtually all deals in the area 
have an investor with an office in the ‘Golden Triangle’.  If we include all investors 
with traceable locations we find that around 52% of investments in the ‘Golden 
Triangle’ (institutional and non-institutional) have a local VC investor, whilst a 
further 10% access funds from other types of local sources.  Similarly, in over 40% of 
these deals the first named syndicate investor is based in the same region as the firm. 
[Insert table five about here] 
Table 6 provides an indication of the depth of the availability of experienced 
investors to guide the firms.  We examine the number of proximate investors involved 
in these deals.  We have focused on demonstrating that the first named investor is 
frequently local to the firm, as well as showing that a high proportion of investments 
have at least one office in a nearby location.  However, we can also expect that there 
maybe further benefits to a firm if there are more than one locally based investor 
operating in the syndicate, as different investors can provide a range of backgrounds 
and contacts to support their firms.  The table below shows the average number of 
investors in local or adjacent regions per deal, and indicate strength in numbers for 
different UK regions.  As with the previous discussion this table shows the large 
differences in the presence of co-location of VC’s across UK regions.  For example, 
institutional deals in the ‘Golden Triangle’ have on average nearly two investors 
based within the regions surrounding the deal, compared to other Northern UK 
regions that have on average less than one investor nearby. 
These findings may be because investors need to collect information and monitor 
companies in order to deal with transactional problems, and/or because of the 
advantages that proximity guarantees as regards the provision of added-value. The 
figures concerning the co-location of investee companies and “first-named” investors 
suggest that co-location may be necessary to embed within local networks and collect 
valuable knowledge and information as well as to develop a direct relationship with 
investees. These figures, however, do not allow us to estimate the influence of either 
factor. 
[Insert table six about here] 
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6.2. Overcoming risk and transaction costs: the advantages of proximity 
The bio-healthcare sector currently represents one of the main targets for VC 
investment in the US and Europe. However, it remains a highly risky business due to 
high attrition rates, high capital requirements, long times of realisation and high 
uncertainty. A primary requirement for investors is to identify and understand such 
risk. Most VCs have personnel with scientific, technical and business experience in 
the area of technological application they invest in. On the one hand, a scientific 
background is necessary to assess the feasibility of the R&D programme and the 
likelihood that the programme will succeed, which may lead to a profitable exit. On 
the other hand, VCs investing in DBFs must frequently deal with inexperienced 
managers, some of whom are research scientists spinning-out from research 
institutions. Hence, identifying and dealing with both information asymmetries and 
managerial gaps represents a key strategic priority.  
Concerning the investment contract, our survey-data show that institutional VCs 
make more extensive use of contractual clauses to protect their investment. However 
smaller investors and BAs tend to rely more on a combination of personal experience 
and localised networks to scout for good opportunities and screen business plans. 
Through social networks they recruit, consult and connect portfolio firms with 
competent people, such as scientists with experience in applied research, experienced 
managers, and a variety of intermediaries.  Personal experience and networks are also 
essential to validate the biotechnology and the potential to develop a sustainable and 
remunerative business.  
“It’s a mixture of technology and execution risk. Attrition risks in running the 
programs, the fact that the drug the programs can usually kind of fall over; 
managerial risk, that is, inexperienced management teams choosing inappropriate 
strategies.” (VC_Scotland_3) 
“In terms of mitigating the risk when selecting the investments it is really about 
asking: ‘Do I understand this?’, both from a medical-disease point of view and from 
a business model point of view. For those who have that expertise in-house and 
there are some, then they do that internally. For those who do not, they will have a 
network of people they can call and have a look at it.” (Other_Scotland_1) 
Through the due diligence process VCs must be able to estimate and manage the 
risk associated with a specific investment. Such knowledge is then accumulated, 
recycled, and exchanged with other investors to assess new opportunities and business 
plans. In this sense, our survey-data shows that VCs benefit from cumulative learning, 
with emphasis on relating personal experience and investment performance, it 
constitutes an essential way to improve the criteria and metrics employed to assess the 
feasibility of upcoming plans.  In this learning process networks play an essential role 
in the process of diffusion and use of critical information. When reliable metrics are 
not available, using expert consultants represents a second-best solution, which 
underlies the importance of professional ties to intermediaries that investors trust and 
can be employed on a regular basis. 
“Biotech companies tend not to have any revenues. It means we can’t use 
standard metrics for evaluating companies. You’ve got to look at value in the 
companies in different ways: usually benchmarking other exits that have taken 
place…looking at other IPOs of companies that are very similar or looking at trade 
sales of companies that have been bought by other partners.” (VC_Cambridge_1) 
“In due diligence, we use good consultants or put in place non-executive directors 
who are experienced in a specific area. That helps us to get more comfortable with 
what the company is doing and appreciate how much risk is there in the 
programs.” (VC_Scotland_3) 
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Early stage investments are considered riskier as they present higher failure rates 
and longer times of realisation. When the founders are inexperienced, VC’s may 
substitute inventors and/or bioscientists for experienced managers able to move ideas 
from the research lab into a profit-oriented business. Other than managers, investors 
may bring in experienced non-executive directors to help remodel the company’s 
strategy and represent the VC on the DBF board. In subsequent stages, it becomes a 
question of building credibility by collaborating with PCs and other DBFs, entering 
clinical trials and establishing a variety of trading relationships that are indispensable 
to commercialise upcoming products and services.   
“We do not only focus on costs and potential revenues; it is also about how we can 
develop and use some of the strength of the business to build a strategic plan. 
Even before the investment we make links between the potential investee and 
other investors, non-execs and prospective business partners” (VC_Scotland_1) 
 “In the smaller companies where the teams are less experienced then obviously 
you have to do a bit more so that often can be things like helping them with 
financial analysis, looking at other exits, and discussing with them about potential 
partners, just generally getting more involved in the business and in trying to assist 
them in whatever they need.” (VC_Scotland_3) 
Thus, one of the reasons why investment syndicates tend to include at least a local 
player is to assess, monitor and support the investee company. In particular, when we 
split the DBFs in our sample into different age groups, we notice that 70% of deals 
involving companies that at the time of completion were less than ten years old are 
characterised by co-location (see Table 7).  Such a result is confirmed across the first 
three age groupings.  Proximity of at least one VC is also maintained in terms of deal 
sequence, suggesting that benefits to being near the firm remain important throughout 
the different stages of investment.  Concerning non-institutional deals, 80% of those 
with information on the syndicate involved co-located dyads. 
On the contrary, the percentage of deals characterised by co-located dyads of 
investees and investors drops to 30% for companies that are more than 10 years old.  
In this older age group of firms the 70% deals without a proximate VC office, are 
classed as the initial rounds of institutional finance received by each firm.  Although 
we note a small number of deals in this age group, the combination of firm age and 
round sequence suggests that these are established firms which have grown without 
‘classic’ VC support and are subsequently looking to expand or restructure and 
therefore have less need for locally based monitoring or assistance. 
 
[Insert table seven about here] 
 
In synthesis, our data-survey shows that VCs investing in DBFs manage high risk 
and transactional problems via a mix of contractual safeguards, direct monitoring, and 
access to local networks to gather information and set up professional ties. Consistent 
with Powell et al (2002) and Madill et al (2005), we find that bigger VCs that employ 
specialised personnel operate and have offices in more than a single location, build 
wider networks and syndicate investments over long distances. On the contrary, non-
institutional and younger investors depend on localised networks and cumulative 
learning. Local ties and professional networks are also built to add-value to investees. 
This phenomenon is more intense when the management team lacks experience 
(University spinouts), and non-institutional investors and specialist VCs (see 6.3) are 
involved. Older and more established companies rely less on local networks. 
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6.3. On contest-dependency and the role of specialised investors   
Section 6.1 shows that both Cambridge and Scotland have higher than average 
investment per GVA ratios. While Cambridge is an emerged bio-cluster, in Scotland 
this can be partly explained by the convergence of Scottish Enterprise co-investment 
scheme towards biotechnology, the role played by BAs (Mason and Harrison 2003) 
and the presence of large VCs such as Scottish Equity Partners (SEP III was largest 
newly formed fund in Europe in 2006).  
Both locations have important forms of expertise and research excellence in the 
life sciences and had been previously interested by the emergence of ICT clusters. 
However, the competitive advantage of Silicon Glen was in low cost manufacturing, 
with a predominance of foreign-owned businesses. This limited R&D investment and 
local involvement in technology transfer results in few strong and extensive science-
technology-market networks.  Around Cambridge, instead, a large number of small 
firms have been able to draw upon university research to penetrate emerging markets. 
Cambridge developed experience and a positive reputation in linking industry and 
academia as well as a range of competent intermediaries.  
“Cambridge is something with universal reputation in terms of biotech and pharma; 
principally because of the proximity to excellent research, the South East led itself 
to biotech companies being set up, being established, being replicated and being 
close. They can attract investors and location is important. Investors are in 
London, so the closer you are to London, the easier it is going be to attend 
meetings, have networks, come up or go there to see them.” (DBF_Cambridge_1) 
Differences between clusters are strongly related to the availability of managerial 
skills. In Cambridge, the existence of a high-tech cluster, proximity to the labs of PCs 
and the high rate of creation on new DBFs has contributed to the increase in number 
of scientists with industrial experience and the presence of experience executives.  
Alongside experience consultants, a local pool of managers has effectively 
contributed to help remedy key competence-gaps in DBFs. As a result, VC investment 
was able to generate entrepreneurial successes, with pervasive effects (Zook 2002) on 
DBFs locate elsewhere. In other regions, the paucity of experienced intermediaries 
and managers constrained VC development and the process of recycling of capitals 
and knowledges.  In the absence of such a virtuous cycle, access to VC constitutes a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to grow successful ventures.  
“Management is probably a bigger limitation in Scotland than money. You cannot 
at the moment, and probably would ever again be able to, build sustainable 
fundable companies based on research assets alone.” (DBF_Scotland_1) 
 “If you want to set up a business just now, go to the North East, because £40-50 
million soft venture capital money is looking for that. The reason they can’t find to 
do it is not the technology, is the lack of CEOs, the lack of business people.” 
(Other_Cambridge_1) 
As we saw earlier, at least one of the partners of the investment syndicate tends to 
be local, which suggests that proximity to investees is a determinant of investment 
decisions. Because of the number of opportunities in the same location, London-based 
investors network and invest prevalently in Cambridge, which means avoiding the 
difficulties associated with monitoring managers when the company is located 
elsewhere. In a similar way, value adding activities also require geographical 
proximity in that both the availability of complementary assets and the development 
of local networks depend on state of development of the local cluster.  
“Most of venture capital investments are made in syndicates of several investors. 
One of them has to be local, because if no one is local, no one can really keep an 
eye on what is happening in the company.” (DBF_Scotland_3) 
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 “I invest in Cambridge because I can see and help them easily; there are people 
around the cluster that I can bring in. Investing in Scotland would be harder. If you 
are an investor and something is long away, you feel less comfortable about it 
because it is harder to detect problems, influence, impact, and help, harder to 
bring the rest of your network, which is why clusters work.” (BA_Cambridge_1) 
Works such as Sorenson and Stuart (2001) emphasise the role of industrial 
specialists; both the accumulation of investment experience and the possibility to 
interact with specialised and trusted co-investors can contribute to expand the 
geographical scope of investing activities.  Hence, in our dataset we code whether 
investors in bio-healthcare are specialist or generalist investors.  A specialist is 
defined as an investor with 60% or more of their total portfolio concentrated in one 
type of investment (biopharma, IT, communications, healthcare, media and the 
financial sector). Table 10 summarises the results of the analysis of specialist 
investors according to region and their proximity to the deal.  Overall we find that a 
small percentage of deals (15%) involve a specialist that is local to the firm.  
However, if a specialist investor is present in a deal, 73% will be based nearby and 
44% local. 
Specialists are concentrated in two locations: the East (Cambridge) and London.  
The implication is that DBFs in London, East and South East have good access to 
finance and value added from specialist investors.  However, in some cases specialists 
are also prepared to invest over distance.  In Scotland, 17 deals involved a specialist, 
but only in one deal were these specialists local. Generally, we find regions outside 
the “Golden-Triangle” have a much lower proportion of deals involving specialist 
VC.  In non-Triangle regions access to finance from a specialist is likely to come 
from an investor located away from the firm. 
 
[Insert table eight about here] 
 
We also ask whether the presence of a specialist has an implication for the 
proximity of other generalist investors.  For example we know that in the East and 
London specialists do the bulk of their investing locally.  In Scotland, the few 
specialists active in the region were not local.  Table 8 shows that for Scottish 
investments involving a specialist, only 5 deals, or 30% involved a proximate 
investor.  The proportion of deals involving a specialist and any proximate investor is 
lower than the overall investor proximity recorded for Scotland in Table 4.  In fact we 
observe for many of the Northern UK regions that the presence of specialist investors 
in a syndicate reduces the chance of any investor proximity, albeit this result may be 
affected by the significant proportion of non-institutional investments that are not 
recorded in official statisticsii (Mason 2005). 
Overall, we observe strong regional concentration of specialist investors in the 
South.  We also find heterogeneity with regards to the influence of specialist investors 
on the proximity of investors.  For some regions such as East (Cambridge), finding a 
specialist investor in the syndicate means there is around a 56% chance that they will 
be local to the deal.  For other regions (especially Scotland) the presence of a 
specialist is likely to decrease the likelihood that the specialist (and/or its co-
investors) will be local. Therefore, while being connected to wider networks, even 
specialist VCs have a strong focus on emerged clusters such as Cambridge. As a 
result, DBFs located within the “Golden Triangle” are probably in the best position to 
exploit the value adding services that competent VC can provide. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
Our qualitative and quantitative data show that the propensity of ‘classic’ VC to 
invest in UK DBFs is contingent on various factors, including the size of the final 
market, the quality of the bioscience, the characteristics of the regulatory regime, and 
the degree of readiness of investee firms. Using their networks and connections, VCs 
help investees to remedy competence and financial gaps and link with commercial 
partners, other intermediaries, and new investors. Further, VCs can provide direct 
support by advising and shaping business strategy. In this respect, variations depend 
on the characteristics of the investors and the experience of the managers involved. 
We found evidence of co-location between investee companies and leading 
investors, with a marked inclination to target DBFs located in bioscience intensive 
regions. As most investments in bio-healthcare are completed by large syndicates, this 
result becomes more evident when we consider that at least one investor is located in 
the same region or in the adjacent region of the investee company. Our motivation to 
take into account VCs in adjacent regions is that many VCs have offices in the City of 
London and seek opportunities in other regions, such as the Eastern region, the South 
East and, to a lesser extent, Scotland. Thus, this method permits identifying which 
regions are the main recipients of the risk capital accumulated in the City of London.  
We envisage various interpretations of the propensity to invest in the “Golden-
Triangle” and, particularly, in the Cambridge area. Initially, this may be due to a 
historical accident: being located a short distance from the City of London helped 
VCs to scout for and perform due-diligence on potential opportunities. Co-location 
was accidental but the proximity of good bioscience and money was crucial to the 
emergence of Cambridge. In this sense, our findings evoke a static interpretation of 
the advantages of co-location. VCs make use of networks to spot, gather information 
about, monitor and mentor investee companies. Networks tend to be local simply 
because most investors, intermediaries and experienced managers happen to be 
located in the proximity (London) of centres of bio-scientific excellence (Cambridge).  
The concentration of these actors allowed for frequent interaction and has had a 
pervasive effect on external DBFs and VCs. The accidental proximity between 
London and Cambridge facilitated the absorption of London-based VCs into 
geographically bounded networks. After that, London-based VCs may have become 
to a degree reluctant to invest in other locations not so much because of the quality of 
the local science but because of the transaction costs, information asymmetries, and 
impracticalities of adding-value over long-distances. 
Following this line of thinking, our static interpretation can be reconciled with 
works such as Audretsch and Stephan (1996), who show that the propensity of key 
actors (scientific advisors) to interact either locally or at distance depends on the stage 
of development of the local cluster, and Powell et al (2002), Niosi and Banik (2005) 
and Porter et al (2005), who explain that the function of VCs within the local system 
varies across time. Such reconciliation suggests a dynamic interpretation of our 
findings as regards the emergence of high tech clusters, a process that involves an 
increase in the number of ‘investor-ready’ opportunities, intensification of VC deals, 
and accumulation of know-how and network contacts. 
According to Mason and Harrison (2003), an ‘investor ready’ project is 
characterised by complete information, realistic expectations and a detailed account of 
how new products and services will be brought to market. Providing such account 
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requires the ability to articulate a vision as to how financial resources will be used to 
achieve such goals. To achieve these goals in the bio-healthcare sector involves 
managing external factors such as regulation or the performance of partners involved 
in collaboration agreements as much as the ability to manage R&D operations, protect 
IP, and find routes to market.  
Thus, while Cambridge hosts the highest proportion of ‘investor-ready’ DBFs, 
VCs would also consider investing more frequently elsewhere but other locations 
present a paucity of real opportunities, not so much because of the quality of the 
science, but because of the relative scarcity of complementary capabilities - such as 
managerial skills. In comparison with Scotland, from the outset Cambridge presented 
not only a very strong bioscience base, but also an established high tech cluster, 
proximity to labs of PCs, and experienced technology consultants. Extended networks 
involving specialists VCs came later, whilst the achievement of successful exists by 
some local DBFs facilitated the accumulation and recycle of capitals and capabilities. 
In Scotland, similar processes are beginning to materialize in distinct geographical 
locations, such as Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Overall, however, Scotland is yet 
to generate the type of incremental dynamics that can help build critical mass 
(Rosiello 2006).  
Our interview data also suggest that bio-cluster emergence coincides with 
processes of cumulative and collective learning: formal and informal networks and 
knowledge flows, collective adaptation to changing conditions, forms of coordinated 
behaviour to deal with transactional problems (dilution and internal conflicts), 
technical challenges (moving compounds through R&D stages) and managerial risks 
(high attrition rates and regulatory uncertainty). All of these mechanisms allow 
learning through direct interaction and apprenticeship.  
Cumulative learning is characterised by knowledge specialisation. VCs need to 
develop an in-depth understanding of the risk associated with the DBFs they invest in. 
BAs are often ex-entrepreneurs and highly networked individuals who have 
accumulated personal experience and contacts. In some cases they have finances to 
re-invest in viable opportunities. Institutional VCs are either entirely focused or 
employ individuals distinctively dedicated to specific types of investments, people 
endowed with the scientific and business background necessary to understand and 
assess the risk associated to R&D programmes and business plans. As noted earlier, 
however, they also extensively rely on their network of contacts. Personal experience 
and networks allow VCs to develop effective routines to evaluate and manage risk in 
areas such as drug discovery and development. 
In summary, in the 1996-2006 period London-based VCs showed a clear 
propensity to invest in the most promising regions. Proximity plays a significant role 
in the transfer and recycle of vital information and know-how (Florida and Smith 
1990), a process which in some cases entails the provision of non-financial added-
value. Crucially, both Cambridge and, to a lesser extent, Scotland present a certain 
degree of “pervasiveness” (Zook 2002), a trend already observed by other works, such 
as Casper and Karamanos (2003) and Niosi and Banik (2005).  We doubt whether UK 
VCs investing in bio-healthcare play the same catalytic role observed by Florida and 
Kenney (1988), Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Avnimelech and Teubal (2006) in 
relation to US and Israeli high tech clusters.  
On the one hand, the interview data confirm a general trend of UK VCs to focus on 
largest late stage deals and search quick exits.  This partly explains the fact that 
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various DBFs in our sample were considering the option to move some operations to 
North-Americaiii. Such trend emerges even in relation to Cambridge and can be 
explained by the need to move closer to a bigger market or a pool of managerial talent 
or a more sophisticated shareholders base (Cooke 2007). On the top of these factors, 
some interviewees stressed lower availability of risk capital and the higher risk 
aversion of London-based VCs. The greater availability of risk capital (and debt 
provision) in the USA is proved by a variety of sources. According to Critical (2006), 
between 2001 and 2004 the equity gap was especially evident at seed-stage (US firms 
got around $15billion against Europe’s $10 billion) and for companies more than 12 
years old ($30 billion against $20 billion). 
“If you want to be successful, you have to have a successful drug in the US and you 
need to access a large amount of capital, which is in the US. From a capital market 
point of view, US biotech companies can raise 10 times the amount of money than 
anyone in the UK can raise.” (DBF_Scotland_4) 
On the other hand, we observe that the existence and presence of specialist VCs 
reflects localised learning processes and allows emerged clusters - such as Cambridge 
- to latch into global networks. Specialists located in the London area make sporadic 
investments outside the ‘Golden Triangle’. However, these deals do not necessarily 
involve any local investors. This result may be due to the paucity of available 
information about the activities carried out especially by informal investors (Mason 
2005) or the lack on trusted partners in some of these locations. While our interview 
data provide some degree of support especially to the former hypothesis, our 
quantitative results confirm the intuition that in the UK bio-healthcare sector 
competent VC tends to follow rather than anticipate cluster emergence.  
These considerations have a series of normative implications for regional 
innovation policy. VC constitutes a key component of regional innovation systems 
that can play a catalytic role. While co-location offers a number of static externalities, 
our study is more in line with demand-side arguments stressing the attractive power of 
‘investor-ready’ opportunities (Mason and Harrison 2003) than supply-side 
approaches that consider VC presence at the core of high-tech clusters as a given. On 
account of the high proportion of deals taking place within the ‘Golden Triangle’, the 
chances other clusters have to attract significant inflows of VC seems partly depend 
on their ability to create a population of investable DBFs. 
In turn, generating such a population requires acting on a number of pre-conditions 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2006), including investments in the local science-base and 
infrastructure of innovation (Powell et al 2002)  in order to allow for cross-pollination 
of knowledges, experimentation of business approaches and development of critical 
skills (Orsenigo 2006; Cooke 2007). Therefore, we are sceptical about the policy 
conclusions reached by influential works such as Gilson (2003), OECD (2003), and 
Da Rin et al (2006). These suggest that capital injections and/or institutional changes 
can be sufficient for the emergence of VC markets and/or industries. In accordance 
with Avnimelech et al (2008), we propose rather that VC policy should be consistent 
with the wider strategic priorities of innovation and technology policy; priorities that 
should anticipate rather than follow VC policy implementation.  
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Appendix I: Qualitative Sample Description 
DBFs in Scotland 
 
Ardana plc 
www.ardana.co.uk 
Founded in 2005, Ardana was a pharmaceutical company 
focused on specialist and secondary care markets (reproductive 
endocrinology, urology, obstetrics & gynaecology) to discover, 
develop and market new products. 
 
Axis-Shield 
 
www.axis-shield.com 
Axis-Shield develops in-vitro diagnostic tests for use in clinical 
laboratories and at the point of care. Created in 1999 via the 
merger of Axis Biochemicals and Shield Diagnostics, the group 
comprises Laboratory Division in Dundee and a Point-of-Care 
division in Oslo. 
 
CXR Biosciences 
 
www.cxrbiosciences.com 
CXR Biosciences was founded in 2002 to address the 
commercial application of in-vivo models and a range 
of specialised techniques and technologies that improve the 
selection of optimal leads through early predictions of the 
ADMET (Absorption, Distribution, Metabolism, Excretion and 
Toxicological) characteristics of compounds. 
CyclaCel Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
 
www.cyclacel.com 
Founded in 1996, Cyclacel Pharmaceuticals Inc. is dedicated to 
the discovery, development and commercialisation of novel 
drugs to treat human cancers. Corporate HQs are in Berkeley 
Heights, New Jersey; primary research facilities in Dundee.  
 
Stem Cell Sciences 
 
www.stemcellsciences.com 
Founded in 2004, Stem Cell Sciences’ core objective is to 
develop safe and effective stem cell-based therapies for 
incurable diseases. The Company has business/scientific 
operations in Edinburgh and Cambridge (UK), Melbourne 
(Australia) and Kobe (Japan).  
DBFs in Cambridge 
 
Astex 
 
www.astex-therapeutics.com 
Founded in 1999, Astex Therapeutics uses high-throughput X-
ray crystallography in a novel fragment-based approach to 
discover and develop small molecule drugs. Its primary focus 
is on oncology and has a broad pipeline of products in clinical 
and pre-clinical development. 
 
Lumora Ltd 
www.lumora.co.uk 
Founded in 2002, Lumora brings molecular diagnostics to 
market, not only for food-borne pathogens but also for GMO 
detection and the establishment of food provenance.  
 
Senexis 
 
www.senexis.com 
Senexis was formed in 2001 to build a pipeline of drug 
development programs for neurological (Alzheimer's disease) 
and systemic degenerative conditions. Optimised lead 
compounds have already shown pre-clinical efficacy. 
 
Phico Therapeutics Ltd. 
 
www.phicotherapeutics.co.uk 
Founded in 2000, it develops a platform technology with the 
potential of producing anti-bacterials active against all species 
of bacteria, including MRSA, and the Gram negative 
bacterium, Escherichia coli.  
Venture Investors 
 
Albany Ventures 
 
www.albanyventures.co.uk 
Albany Ventures invest in technology companies based in the 
UK and Ireland, with a specific focus on enterprise software 
and healthcare. In November 2006 Albany Ventures was 
acquired by the Alliance Trust PLC. Albany Venture recently 
exited from Domantis, which was sold to GlaxoSmithKline for 
£230 million, and has in its portfolio Ardana, co-invested with 
3i, Deutsche Venture Capital, MVM and TVM. 
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Andy Richards 
 
(information source: 
www.biologyinbusiness.org) 
A serial biotechnology entrepreneur and business angel, Andy 
Richards is currently director of Vectura plc, Geneservice, 
Biowisdom, Daniolabs, Theradeas, Cancer Research 
Technology Ltd and Babraham Bioscience Technology Ltd. 
Co-founder of Chiroscience in 1992.  
 
CREATE Partners Limited 
 
www.createpartners.com 
A fund management company that addresses the early stage 
funding gap between angels and mainstream venture capitalists 
and invests in companies focusing on emerging business 
opportunities. Create East of England Fund (£20m) since 2003 
has made 29 investments across various sectors. 
 
NW Brown Group Ltd 
 
www.nwbrown.co.uk 
Founded in Cambridge in 1974. In 2003 it launched GEIF 
Ventures, a £5m co-investment fund to match investments 
made by business angels into high-growth companies. In 2006 
it launched in partnership with two angel networks a £25m 
investment fund, IQ Capital Fund I LP, focused on early stage 
companies in high tech sectors. IQ Capital is part of the 
Enterprise Capital Fund (ECF) program. 
 
Pentech Ventures 
 
www.pentechvc.com 
Pentech Ventures focus on software infrastructure and 
applications, for internet content creation and management, 
communications, and for the new range of internet access 
devices. With offices in Scotland and London, Pentech invests 
prevalently in software companies in the UK and Eire. 
 
Scottish Equity Partners 
(SEP) 
 
www.sep.co.uk 
SEP is one of the largest VCs in Europe, with over £300M 
under management. With offices in Glasgow and London, SEP 
has specialist sector teams that focus on investments in 
information technology, healthcare & life sciences and energy 
related technology businesses. Last year, around 75% of SEP’s 
investments were in early stage companies.  
Other Organisations 
Babraham Bioscience 
Technologies (BBT) Ltd 
 
www.babraham.co.uk 
A wholly-owned trading company of the Babraham Institute. 
BBT was founded in 1996. The company exploits science and 
technology deriving from the Institute’s research programs and 
takes responsibility for managing the patent portfolio.  
East of England 
Development Agency 
(EEDA) 
www.eeda.org.uk 
The East of England agency for sustainable economic growth 
and regeneration. Its task is to improve the region's economic 
performance and ensure the East of England remains one of the 
UK's top performing regions. 
 
ERBI 
 
www.erbi.co.uk 
Established in 1997 with a grant for 3 years from the DTI. As a 
networking organisation for Cambridge and the East of England, 
it provides a platform for biotechnology and related companies 
to interact. In 2000 ERBI became a private, not-for-profit, 
membership-based company with almost 300 members. 
Skillcast Ltd 
 
www.skillcast.co.uk 
A consultancy firm specialising in growing knowledge-driven 
sectors. It advises public bodies on innovation policy, 
commercialisation structures and funding. Skillcast has been 
involved in the setting up the Scottish Co-Investment Fund and 
helped raising an additional £25 million.  
ITI Life Sciences 
 
www.itilifesciences.com 
Established in 2003, ITI Life Sciences is one of the three 
Intermediary Technology Institutes (total investment £450M) set 
up in 2003 by Scottish Enterprise with the support of the 
Scottish Executive to identify and commercialise valuable 
technology-based intellectual assets. 
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Tables 
Table 1: VC investment in European Countries - Absolute and relative values 
Healthcare Medicare % Biotechnology %
UK 1,071,393 35.6 171,234 24.9
Germany 744,591 25.6 150,461 21.9
France 233,294 10.8 143,524 20.9
Netherlands 218,240 6.9 24,367 3.5
Switzerland 24,418 1.1 17,173 2.5
Sweden 95,392 4.5 64,211 9.3
EU Total 2,801,209 686.617
VC Investment in 2004 (in € x 1,000) EVCA (2005)
 
Source: EVCA (2005) 
 
Table 2: Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical deals (Jan 2000-Sept 2006) 
Deal count Value (£000's)
GOR
VC Deal Deal (non-
institutional 
VC)
Other 
(Grant/ 
charity)
Total VC Deal Deal (non-
institutional 
VC)
Other 
(Grant/ 
charity)
Total
East 144 24 21 189 566,325 86,229 5,008 657,562
East Midlands 13 4 2 19 9,930 1,268 70 11,268
London 52 13 14 79 192,420 12,520 6,973 211,913
North East 13 7 6 26 20,726 2,543 2,454 25,723
North West 24 4 5 33 103,649 1,030 1,270 105,949
Northern Ireland 4 4 1,775 1,775
Scotland 36 12 14 62 220,326 4,340 1,067 225,733
South East 70 15 7 92 357,790 13,410 1,630 372,830
South West 28 4 5 37 63,933 5,100 1,832 70,865
Wales 8 3 2 13 1,945 356 1,313 3,614
West Midlands 4 1 5 1,085 8 1,093
Yorkshire/Humber 24 5 4 33 11,060 12,540 1,382 24,982
Grand Total 420 91 81 592 1,550,964 139,336 23,007 1,713,307  
Authors’ calculation of Library House data based on authors regional coding 
 
Table 3: Investment relative to regional GVA, 2000-2005 (ratios shown x1000) 
Work place Residence
East of England 1.32 1.16
East Midlands 0.03 0.03
London 0.16 0.19
North East 0.11 0.15
North West 0.17 0.17
Northern Ireland 0.01 0.01
Scotland 0.51 0.51
South East 0.41 0.38
South West 0.12 0.12
Wales 0.01 0.01
West Midlands 0.00 0.01
Yorkshire 0.05 0.05
UK 0.23 0.23
GOR Estimation of GVA basis
 
Authors’ calculation of Library House data based on authors regional coding 
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Table 4: Location of the nearest syndicate BVCA members 
within same region within the same or 
adjacent region
East 98 71% 68% 99% 10
East Midlands 11 85% 55% 64% 5
London 23 44% 100% 100% 154
North East 10 77% 80% 90% 6
North West 17 71% 53% 65% 19
Northern Ireland 1 25% 100% 100% 4
Scotland 20 56% 55% 55% 17
South East 43 54% 30% 98% 13
South West 19 68% 58% 89% 7
Wales 4 50% 100% 100% 2
West Midlands 2 50% 100% 100% 13
Yorkshire 17 71% 82% 82% 8
Grand Total 265 63% 64% 90% 195
No. of BVCA 
members with 
offices in 
region
GOR Deals with BVCA member in syndicate 
with an office:
Deals with BVCA 
member involved
Percentage of 
all institutional 
VC deals
 
Authors’ research of VC office locations based on Library House deals 
Table 5: Biopharmaceutical investments made in counties in Golden Triangle Oxford - Cambridge – 
London 2000-Sept 2006 
Count Value Count Value Count Value Count Value
Cambridgeshire 121         469,677  20           85,345    17           4,318      158           559,340     
Oxfordshire 38           231,546  3             5,010      2             400         43             236,956     
London 52           192,420  13           12,520    14           6,973      79             211,913     
Bedfordshire 5             2,625      1             -          1             -          7               2,625         
Hertfordshire 4             3,087      -          -          -          -          4               3,087         
Total 220         899,355  37           102,875  34           11,691    291           1,013,921  
County Deal Deal (non-inst) Other Total
 
Authors’ calculation of Library House data based on authors regional coding 
 
Table 6: Average number of investors in local or adjacent regions per deal 
Institutional deals All deals
Local Local or adjacent Local Local or adjacent
East 0.9 2.0 0.7 1.5
East Midlands 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.5
London 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.2
North East 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4
North West 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Northern Ireland 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Scotland 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.6
South East 0.6 1.8 0.4 1.4
South West 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6
Wales 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9
West Midlands 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7
Yorkshire 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8
UK 0.9 1.5 0.6 1.1
Triangle 1.0 1.9 0.8 1.5
GOR
 
Authors’ research of VC office locations based on Library House deals 
Table 7: Institutional investment deals 
Same region Same or adjacent 
region
0  years < x <= 2  years 131 175 250 52% 70%
2  years < x <= 5  years 73 105 147 50% 71%
5  years < x <= 10 years 25 37 52 48% 71%
10 years < x <= 20 years 1 3 10 10% 30%
Total 230 320 459 50% 70%
Age (x) at time of round Location of VC with respect to firm: Total no. 
of deals
 % of deals with 
VC within 
adjacent region
 % of deals 
with VC in 
same region
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Table is based on institutional investment deals (total of 463 deals) with named syndicate members available.  VC 
location is based on the nearest office location of VC syndicate member.  T-test confirms statistically significant 
difference between the proportion of proximate investors in 10-20 years group and other age groups - 5% level. 
Table 8:  Proximity of specialists (Jan 1996-Sept 2006) 
GOR Count of deals Specialist in 
local region
Specialist in 
local or adjacent 
region
Specialist in 
local region and 
is an institutional 
VC
Any investor in 
local region
Any investor in 
local or adjacent 
region
East 86 48 84 42 62 85
East Midlands 1 0 0 0 0 1
London 37 30 30 20 36 36
North East 2 0 0 0 1 1
North West 14 2 2 0 4 6
Northern Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scotland 17 1 1 0 3 5
South East 34 6 29 2 17 32
South West 12 1 3 0 3 6
Wales 3 3 3 3 3 3
West Midlands 1 0 0 0 0 0
Yorkshire 8 4 4 2 5 5
Grand Total 215 95 156 69 134 180
Deals featuring specialist 
 
Authors’ calculation of Library House data 
                                                 
i This provided data on the names of investors and the amount of VC investment received as well as 
information on other forms of equity finance received during the history of the firm.  The locations of 
firms were also cross-referenced with information from the FAME database, which provides details on 
SME in the UK, and company WebPages. All of the companies in the sample are based in the UK, 
whereas investors have HQs and offices worldwide.  In addition we also collected data on the location 
of investors detailed in the database using information provided online by the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA) on their member’s office locations, and by consulting the WebPages of active 
investment firms in our population of DBFs. 
ii One exception to this is the North West, which has a higher level of investor proximity when 
specialist investors are found in the syndicate, although the specialists themselves are not local to the 
deal.   
iii Some DBFs, such as Cyclacel and Stemcell Science, implemented that strategy. 
